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evidence. 10 It refused to recognize a third party's right to set up
such evidence, 1 yet the dissenting opinion makes it clear that New
York has previously sustained such attack by persons who were not
directly connected with the action.' 2 It is believed that this controversial subject will continue to be the basis of much court litigation.
No sooner had the Court of Appeals rendered its opinion when, in
a lower court in New York State, a similar problem arose. The
lower court refused to follow this decision but preferred to abide
by the old weight of authority, declaring that the Nevada decree was
invalid upon the contention that the domicile established was not
bona fide and that therefore it was never within the jurisdiction of
Nevada to hand down such a decree.' 3
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MURDER-REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT BECAUSE OF COURT'S STATEMENT THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED.-Defen-

dants Munford, Jackson and Greene were convicted of murder in the

first degree. The jury found that the former inflicted the fatal stab
and that the latter two were fellow conspirators. The crime was
the result of an argument over certain gambling activities which
occurred at the victim's gambling house. Munford, in the company
of Jackson and Greene, arrived at the deceased's apartment and within
a short while, a quarrel ensued. The victim, Eason, rushed from the
room and fled a few blocks with the three defendants following him.
H-ere there was conflicting testimony as to whether the stab was
already inflicted when the deceased left, or whether the crime was
actually consummated at a distant spot after the three defendants
had conspired to kill him. Thus, whether there was a conspiracy,
became one of the most important questions of fact which the jury

had to determine. Upon this point the testimony of the prosecution's witness, Bey, was vital. After repeatedly denying that he
recognized the three defendants, positively identified them as three
men whom he had seen leave the victim's apartment and pursue him.
When asked to repeat any conversation he had overheard, defendants
objected unless he could name the specific defendant who had spoken.
The court overruled this objection "on the ground there is a continuing conspiracy at that particular time." The prosecution, relying
on circumstantial evidence, tried to show that the crime was com10 Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933); Matter of
Kimball, 155 N. Y. 62, 49 N. E. 331 (1898); Cross v. Cross, 108 N. Y. 628,
15 N. E. 333 (1888).
11 The validity of a judgment could not be challenged after it became final
and the issue decided therein could not be litigated again between the parties
to the action or their privies. See Chicot County Drainage District v. Boston
State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 84 L. ed. 329 (1939).
12 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 47 L. ed. 366 (1902).
The decree
was attacked bOythe second wife, a third party.
13 Ammermuller v. Ammermuller, 181 Misc. 98 (1943), decided by Supreme
Court, Special Term, N. Y. County, Dec. 13, 1943.
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mitted several blocks away, by producing an unidentified knife that
was found at that location. Held, reversed. The jury's finding that
the three defendants were members of a conspiracy, was influenced
by the court's statement that there was a continuing conspiracy;
the language thus used was prejudicial to the defendant's substantial
rights. The mere fact that co-defendants accompanied Munford from
the apartment, was not enough to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that they aided and abetted in the killing." Also, the finding of an
unidentified knife at a particular place did not authorize an inference
that the crime was committed nearby. The inference was based upon
conjecture and not upon knoW.vn or proven facts which are the essentials of circumstantial evidence. 2 People v. Jackson, 291 N. Y. 451,

52 N. E. (2d) 945 (1943).
The most significant portion of this decision is that which relates
to the court's remarks on a question of fact which should have been
reserved for the jury. It is well settled that no court has the authority
to affect the fair and impartial deliberations of the jury. Whether
certain remarks uttered by the court may be considered prejudicial
to the defendant's rights is not a novel problem. As early as 1905
New York had held that statements made by a trial court may be
open to criticism, but that they are not error, unless they may have
affected the result of the trial.3 So, although a court went so far as
to indicate a personal disbelief of accused's testimony, and a conjecture of accused's guilt, it was held not to be prejudicial error where
the evidence left no doubt as to defendant's guilt and did not affect
the result of the trial.4 In a later decision, however, the opposite
result was reached when it was shown that sarcastic remarks bly
the court did operate to the detriment of the defendant.5 Very
recently it was held that where the trial court admonished defense
counsel for his persistence, it did not disclose prejudicial bias, since
no opinion as to the guilt of accused was expressed. 6 Following these
decisions, the court, in the principal case, came to the conclusion that
where the trial judge, upon admitting certain evidence, stated that
he did so in view of the conspiracy between the defendants, such
statement was deemed prejudicial to the defendants on the ground
that determination of the presence of a conspiracy was in the province
of the jury.
L.R.
I People v. Weiss, 290 N. Y. 160, 48 N. E. (2d) 306 (1943) ; English v.
Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 446, 42 S. W. (2d) 706 (1931).
2 "Every reasonable hypothesis should be explored where circumstantial
evidence is relied on to prove slayer's guilt." Flevellen v. State, 113 Tex. Cr.
22, 18 S. W. (2d) 1087 (1929).
3 People v. Estell, 106 App. Div. 516, 94 N. Y. Supp. 748 (1905).
4 People v. Armellino, 196 App. Div. 950, 188 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1921);
accord, People v. De Maio, 243 N. Y. 588, 154 N. E. 616 (1927); People v.
Froelich, 185 N. Y. 615, 78 N. E. 1102 (1906).
5People v. Robins, 242 App. Div. 516, 275 N..Y. Supp. 940 (1935).
6 United States v. Liss, 137 F. (2d) 995 (1943).

